On 2 September 2019, the European Space Agency’s Aeolus Earth observation satellite was required to make an immediate axial shift — commonly known as a ‘delta-V’ manoeuvre — to avoid collision with SpaceX’s Starlink-44 satellite, which had lowered its orbital plane for system testing. Although SpaceX was notified of the imminent collision risk posed by changing Starlink-44’s orbit to the same altitude of Aeolus, SpaceX refused to change position, thereby requiring ESA to fire Aeolus’ thrusters to change orbit. On 3 December 2021 — two years after the Aeolus near-miss — the People’s Republic of China filed a note verbale to UNOOSA, detailing two instances of performing delta-v safety manoeuvres for its crewed platform the Tiangong space station to avoid collisions with satellites. Central to the issues facing both Aeolus and Tiangong is one party having to take the burden of performing a delta-v manoeuvre to change course. Spacecraft are equipped with a finite supply of propellant, thereby providing a limited amount of delta-v safety manoeuvres that can be performed before the propellant is exhausted. Where a propellent is exhausted, or near exhaustion, a spacecraft’s mission profile may be severely degraded, and it may have to be de-orbited. This paper will consider the liabilities of one party having to be compelled to frequently expend propellent to avoid collision due to a second party’s action and propose regulatory solutions to mitigate undue propellant expenditure.